1.0 Introduction

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), Enhanced Monitoring to Detect APT Activity Targeting Outlook Online, to provide guidance to agencies and critical infrastructure organizations on enhancing monitoring in Microsoft Exchange Online environments. 

2.0 Impact
In June 2023, a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency identified suspicious activity in their Microsoft 365 (M365) cloud environment. The agency reported the activity to Microsoft and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Microsoft determined that advanced persistent threat (APT) actors accessed and exfiltrated unclassified Exchange Online Outlook data.

3.0 Technical Details
In Mid-June 2023, an FCEB agency observed MailItemsAccessed events with an unexpected ClientAppID and AppID in M365 Audit Logs. The MailItemsAccessed event is generated when licensed users access items in Exchange Online mailboxes using any connectivity protocol from any client. The FCEB agency deemed this activity suspicious because the observed AppId did not normally access mailbox items in their environment. The agency reported the activity to Microsoft and CISA.

Microsoft determined that APT actors accessed and exfiltrated unclassified Exchange Online Outlook data from a small number of accounts. The APT actors used a Microsoft account (MSA) consumer key to forge tokens to impersonate consumer and enterprise users. Microsoft remediated the issue by first blocking tokens issued with the acquired key and then replacing the key to prevent continued misuse. Microsoft determined that this activity was part of a campaign targeting multiple organizations (all of which have been notified by Microsoft). [1]

The affected FCEB agency identified suspicious activity by leveraging enhanced logging—specifically of MailItemsAccessed events—and an established baseline of normal Outlook activity (e.g., expected AppID). The MailItemsAccessed event enables detection of otherwise difficult to detect adversarial activity.

CISA and FBI are not aware of other audit logs or events that would have detected this activity. Critical infrastructure organizations are strongly urged to implement the logging recommendations in this advisory to enhance their cybersecurity posture and position themselves to detect similar malicious activity.

4.0 Recommendations
MyCERT strongly encourage critical infrastructure organizations to ensure audit logging is enabled.

In addition to enabling audit logging, MyCERT strongly encourage organizations to:

  • Enable Purview Audit (Premium) logging. This logging requires licensing at the G5/E5 level. See Microsoft’s guidance on Assigning Microsoft 365 Licenses to Users for additional information.
  • Ensure logs are searchable by operators. The relevant logs need to be accessible to operational teams in a platform (e.g., security operations center [SOC] tooling) that enables hunting for this activity and distinguishing it from expected behavior within the environment.
  • Enable Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Logging (UAL). UAL should be enabled by default, but organizations are encouraged to validate these settings.
  • Understand your organization’s cloud baseline. Organizations are encouraged to look for outliers and become familiar with baseline patterns to better understand abnormal versus normal traffic.

All mitigation actions for this activity are the responsibility of Microsoft due to the cloud-based infrastructure affected; however, MyCERT recommend that critical infrastructure organizations implement the following to harden their cloud environments. Although, these mitigations will not prevent this or related activity where actors leverage compromised consumer keys, they will reduce the impact of less sophisticated malicious activity targeting cloud environments.

  • Separate administrator accounts from user accounts according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) guidance, AC-5: Separation of Duties. Only allow designated administrator accounts to be used for administration purposes. If an individual user requires administrative rights over their workstation, use a separate account without administrative access to other hosts.
  • Collect and store access and security logs for secure cloud access (SCA) solutions, endpoint solutions, cloud applications/platforms and security services, such as firewalls, data loss prevention systems, and intrusion detection systems.
  • Use a telemetry hosting solution (e.g., SIEM solution) that aggregates logs and telemetry data to facilitate internal organization monitoring, auditing, alerting, and threat detection activities.
  • Review contractual relationships with all Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) and ensure contracts include:
    • Security controls the customer deems appropriate.
    • Appropriate monitoring and logging of provider-managed customer systems.
    • Appropriate monitoring of the service provider’s presence, activities, and connections to the customer network.
    • Notification of confirmed or suspected activity.

Generally, MyCERT advises the users of this devices to be updated with the latest security announcements by the vendor and follow best practice security policies to determine which updates should be applied.

Kindly refer to the following URL for more information: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-193a

For further enquiries, please contact MyCERT through the following channels:

E-mail: cyber999[at]cybersecurity.my 
Phone: 1-300-88-2999 (monitored during business hours) 
Mobile: +60 19 2665850 (24x7 call incident reporting) 
Business Hours: Mon - Fri 09:00 -18:00 MYT 
Web: https://www.mycert.org.my 
Twitter: https://twitter.com/mycert 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/mycert.org.my

5.0    References